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The power exercised by American courts to hold statutes
unconstitutional is a very marked feature of our jurisprudence.
It furnishes to the judiciary, which has often been called the
weakest of the departments of government, a weapon by which
it becomes, in some senses, more powerful than any other.
For, as the judiciary usually operates in the last instance between man and man, it has ordinarily the power to enforce the
prevalence of its view. The Legislature may pass laws, and
the executive may execute; but in cases of dispute, the
judiciary is almost certain to be the last department to be
called upon, and it may then ignore statutes, and may release
a prisoner or undo many other acts which the executive has
done. And, when it does so, its opinion is almost always the
one to prevail. The judfciary has thus come to be in America
a department having a vast influence on constitutional development and even in questions of a political nature.
It is surely of the utmost importance that a function of such
far-reaching power should be carefully guarded and should
not be abused. Doubtless, in the development of our political
system, the judiciary has gained and has deserved more respect
than our legislatures, or generally our executives; but, if this
pre-eminence is to remain, the judiciary must not be too much
dragged into the political struggles of the day, and it must
exercise this great function with scrupulous care. To deny a
law operation, unless it is plainly in violation of the constitution, is an abuse of power, vhich cannot but tend to bring the
judiciary into disrepute. A well-known writer has examined
this subject quite recently, and I shall do no more than refer
to his article,' where special emphasis is thrown upon the
scrupulous care with which the power in question should be
exercised.
1 IThe origin and scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law," by Prof. James B. Thayer, HarivardLaw Review, November, 1893.
25

26

EXPOSITORY STATUTES

ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Very recently a decision has been rendered in the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in a case of this nature, which seems so
palpably an error as to call for notice. In Com'tz ex rel.
Rom'y v. [ern-wick (37 Weekly Notes, 253), it is held that an
Act of 1867, which construes an Act of 1854, is unconstitutional and invalid as to a case arising years afterward, in 1895.
The Legislature has no power, says the decision, to pass an
expository, Act, which will bind the judiciary in interpreting
the prior statute. Such an expository Act is an interference
with the judicial function of interpretation. It is to be expressly observed that the decision goes to the effect of holding
that the Legislature cannot pass a valid expository Act, even
in rega-d to entire/y fittnre transactions. The question as to
the effect of such a statute on past transactions is quite a
different one, as then the statute may be expostfacto or may
violate the obligation of contracts; but, the case in hand cannot and does not pretend to go on this ground, and I propose
to confine the discussion entirely to the question of the validity
of expository, Acts in changing the law for future transactions.
Can it be that an enactment that a past law shall be "construed
to mean" so-and-so, is unconstitutional and inoperative, as to
cases arising after the date of the expository Act ? It is submitted, with all respect, that such an enactment is perfectly
valid, and that the decision referred to is lamentably wrong.
In the first place, it is to be observ'ed that the decision
sticks sadly in the bark, and makes a question of great constitutional import turn on the mere use of a phrase. For it
cannot be questioned for a moment, but that the Legislature
could repeal the words whose meaning it wants to change and
then enact in their place the new words. It could repeal the
whole statute in question, or it could repeal half of it or one
clause or one word ; and it could substitute new words or
clauses in place of the portion repealed. And this is precisely
what it did in the case in hand, the only difference being in the
form of expression used to attain the end. It did enact a new
law by the use of the usual words be it enacted, but in a later
portion of the statute, instead of using the formal word
"repeal," it said, " shall be construed to mean." It is surely

EXPOSITORY STATUTES ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

27

*a very narrow rule which makes a question of the constitutional validity of a law turn upon the question, whether the
legislative body has used tie words "repeal " and "re-enact,"
or has used the phrase, " shall be construed to mean."
Nor is the rule laid down merely narrow, but it is directly
contrary to the whole history of legislation. The phrase that
a law shall be" construed to mean " is and always has been
an ordinary and usual one for modifying statutes or judicial
decisions, nor has its validity been questioned. It will be
found in multitudes of statutes, ancient and modern, in slightly
varying form. Thus, to produce a few instances from the
legislation of the State concerned, the Statute of Frauds
reads " all leases . . . shall have the force and effect ....
and shall not be deemed or taken," &c. The Act of 1770,
as to married women's acknowledgments, enacts that no
deed acknowledged in a certain customary way before
a justice of the peace "shall be deemed, held or adjudged
invalid," &c. The Act of 1715 enacts that, in a deed, "the
words grant, bargain,sell, shall be adjudged an express covenant," &c. The Act 1 of June 25, 178 1, § 2, enacts that "the
meaning of the word 'location,' in the fifth section of the Act
of ....
was, is, and is hereby declared to be," &c. These
cases are not in the identical words of the Act in the principal
case, but a casual turning over of a small portion of one
volume of Purdon's Digest soon discovered a multitude in
precisely that form, some instances of which will be given.
"The fifteenth section of an act . . . . is hereby 2 construed to extend to and apply only . . . . to manorial
lands in the city and county of Philadelphia." "The acts
. . . . shall be taken and construed' to include" or "to
enable,"' or "shall from henceforth beI construed," or "shall
not be construed 6 to apply; "...no
lien created by act .

IPurdon's

Digest, I, p. 1175, pl. 13.

2

Act of 4 May, 1852, P 7, Ibid, 1211, pl. 9.
3 Act of 26 April, 1854, 1 x, Ibid, 644, pl. 89.
4Act of ig April, 1864, 1 I, Ibid, 969, pl. 7.
5

6

Act of 25 April, 185o,

Act of 9 April, x849,

12, Ibid, 429, pl. 131.

6, Ibid, 1i69, p1 . 29.
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shall be construed' to be within; " no act heretofore passed
shall be so construed " as to prevent;
" the act . . . . shall
not be so 3 construed as to destrok." A very favorite form '
seems to have been about this, "the true intent and meaning
of an Act passed .

. .

. be, and is hereby declared to be."

Moreover, there are all shades of varieties from the form of an
express repeal to that of a mere construing. "The provi'cns
of the Act .

. .

. shall not hereafter'

extend,"

or

"are

hereby declared and enacted not to 6 apply," or shall apply to
cases 7 only," or, on the other hand, "are hereby 8extended,"
or "that an act . . . be so amended as to 9 allow."

These illustrations are enough to show that such forms of
expression are and have been a well-recognized and usual
mode of legislation in the very State where the decision is
made. Nor is the form confined to that State. The text-book
writers recognize it, and no one of them questions its validity.
Thus, Cooley makes his whole discussion of the general
subject turn on the question, whether the declaratory Act was
intended to have a restrospective operation or not, and says
expressly: "It is always competent to change an existing law
by a declaratory statute; and wherc the stainteis only to oprate
upon futmre cases, it is no objection to its validity that it

assumes the law to have been in the past what it is now
declared that it shal! be in the future. But the legislative
action cannot be made to retroact upon past controversies,"
'Act
of li Apri., 18,;5,
2
3

Act of 22 March. 1850,

2, Ibid, 653, pl. 142.
2, Ibid, 788, pl. 8.

Act of 4 April, 1843, ', 7, Ibid. 1rOO, pl. 32.
4
Act of 16 'March. 1871, ; r, Ibid, 429, pl. 134; Act of 17 April, 1856,
I, Ibid, 6o5, pl. i8r ; Act of 3 o March, 1869, i, Ibid, 605, pl. 182 ; Act
4, Ibid, 6io, pl. 207; Act of x6 April, 1845, l. 11, Ibid,
Iarch, 1867,
I, Ibid. 1216, pl. 28; Act of zi
December, iS66.
i, Ibid, 1243, pl. 23; Act of ii February, 1873,
I,
Ibid, 1243, pl. 25; Act of 25 February, 1856, 1.i, Ibid, io63, pl. 7.
5
Act of 25 April, 185o,
7, Ibid, 1215, pl. 25.
1 Act of 16 June. iS35,
3, Ibid, 590, pl. 1O5 ; Act of 15 May, 185o, 8,
Ibid, 59o, pl. 1o6.
7Act of i8 March, 1852, 4, Ibid, 641, pl. 72.
'Act of 13 June. IS4o, IO, Ibid. 792, pl. 27.
o
"Act of ij May, 187 4 , r,
r Ibid, 93 , pl. 6.
I" Const. Limita's. - 94.
of 25 April, 185o.,

IWO1,pl. 33; Act of 28
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etc. So, Endlich also writes:' "A cun.;truction put upon an
Act by the Legislature itself, by means of a provision embodied in the same, that it shall or shall not be construed in a
certain designated manner, is binding upon the courts,
although the latter, without such a direction, would have
understood the language to mean something different ...
Moreover, a statute declaratory of a former one has the same
effect upon the construction of such former Act, in the absence
of intervening rights, as if the declaratory Act had been embodied in the original Act at the time of its passage." And
2
the same principle is fully set forth by other writers.
The distinction between Acts of this nature, which are
intended to apply to fuure cases on'y, and those which are
retro-active, is vital, but'was not sufficiently observed in the
opinion jn Com'tli v. Mar-wick; thus, of the principal cases cited
by the court in support of its view, _1orman v. Z-eist (5W. &
S., 170, turned on a law attempting to legitimate certain
bastards, and thus to transfer to them property already vested
by the death of the ancestor in other actualiy legitimate children; DeChastcllux v. Fairchild(15 Penna. 18), was an attempt
by statute to order a new trial in a case already judicially
determined; Bolton v. Johns (5 Penna. 145), held a construing
statute invalid as to past transactions, but fully recognized its
validity as to cases where rights had not become fixed before
its passage; and O'Connorv. IVarn'e (4W. & S. 223), upheld
an expositing Act, and the discussion turned entirely on the
question, whether or not.rights had become vested under the
original Act before its construction by the later one. Moreover, cases were cited in the argument of Com'th v. Warwick,
which fully recognize the validity of expositing Acts as to
future cases. Thus, to refer to the latest one only, the true
principle was recognized in Tituisville hron IForks v. Keystone
Oil Co., 122 Penna. 633, where the court write: " Expository
statutes, and statutes directing the courts what construction
should be given to previous legislation were not uncommon
'Interpretation of Statutes, p. 365.
2

See, e.g., Pomeroy's Sedgwick on Construction of Statutory Law,
p. 214; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 402.
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prior to 1874, and the courts, while pronouncing all such
legislation to be judicial in its character and void as to any
retro-active effect intended, yet sought to give effect to the
legislative vill, however expressed as to future cases. As the
constitution prescribed no form or order into which the legislative expression was to be cast, the court sought to give effect
to the purpose, however expressed."
The legislativ'e intent cannot be doubted in any of these
cases, nor in regard to the Act of 1867 construing the Act of
1854. When they passed that statute in the usual form, "be
it enacted," etc., that certain words shall be construed to
mean thus and so, no human being can doubt what they
meant. And I submit that such a form of legislation is a
very clear and distinct method of 'accomplishing their purpose; they want to substitute certain words by others, and
how could they better exoress their meaning? Even, therefore, were there no precedents, the matter would be very plain;
but, when it is seen that the text-books and decisions of
authority recognize the validity of such laws, and that multitudes of such laws have been passed-some of them of the
highest degree of importance-during a long course of years
and never been questioned, I submit that the decision is wrong
and harmful.
It should possibly be noted that the decision in Com'/Iz v.
Warwick relates to a law earlier than 1874, and is, therefore,
free from any question growing out of the language of the
Constitution of 1874, as to the formalities required for repealing or modifying a statute.
WM. M. MEIGS.

